| Leading up to the
Incident
In violation of the neutrality
of Laos accorded at Geneva in a 14-nation protocol conference
July 23, 1962, the North Vietnamese and supporting communist
insurgent group, the Pathet Lao, lost no time in building
strategic strongholds of defense in Northern Laos and
establishing a steady flow of manpower and material to their
revolutionary forces in South Vietnam via the Ho Chi Minh Trail
on the eastern border of the Laotian panhandle.
As a result, the Royal Lao
sought help from the U.S. In turn, U.S. involvement in Laos was
justified by an expected quick victory in Vietnam. Every
initiative had to be cleared through the U.S. Ambassador at
Vientiane, so that the delicate balance of
"look-the-other-way-neutrality" engaged in by the nations
involved (including China) could be preserved. Before many years
passed, however, it became clear that the U.S. would have no
"quick victory" in Vietnam, and the secret war in Laos grew more
difficult to contain.
Defense of non-communist
activity in Laos generally fell into three categories: 1) U.S.
Army and CIA's bolstering of the Meo (Hmong) army led by General
Vang Pao; 2) Strategic U.S. Air Force bombing initiatives on the
Ho Chi Minh Trail (Operations Commando Hunt, Steel Tiger, etc.);
3) U.S. Air Force bombing initiatives in northern Laos (Operation
Barrell Roll, etc.) both against communist strongholds there, and
in support of the Royal Lao and Gen. Vang Pao's army.
|